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Under the Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries committed to emission reductions
may full¯l part of their obligations by implementing emission reduction projects in
developing countries. In doing so, they make use of the so-called Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM). Two important issues surround the implementation of the CDM.
First, if the cheapest abatement measures are implemented for CDM projects, develop-
ing countries may be left with only more expensive measures when they have to meet
their own commitments in the future (the so-called low-hanging fruits issue). Second,
a choice must be made on the type of baseline against which emission reductions are
measured: an absolute baseline or a relative (to output) one (the baseline issue). The
purpose of this paper is to study the interactions between these two issues from the
point of view of the developing country. Two major results are obtained. First, when
possible future commitments for developing countries and irreversibility of abatement
measures are taken into account, we show that the industry where CDM projects are
implemented enjoys larger pro¯ts under an absolute baseline than under a relative
one. Second, concerning the low-hanging fruits problem, the ¯nancial compensation
required by the developing country for implementing `too many' CDM projects is larger
under the relative baseline.1 Introduction
In Kyoto, December 1997, industrialized countries agreed on greenhouse gas emission
limitations for the period 2008-2012. The Kyoto Protocol allows for the use of sev-
eral so-called °exible mechanisms, among which are (i) the trade of emission quotas
between industrialized countries (Emissions Trading, Art. 17) and (ii) the possibility
for industrialized countries to full¯l part of their obligations by reducing emissions in
developing countries (not committed to emission limitations or reductions) via the im-
plementation of speci¯c projects (Clean Development Mechanism, Art. 6). Our focus
here is on the second mechanism, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). On the
one hand, the CDM should help industrialized countries to reduce their emissions at a
lower cost than if they were not allowed to have access to the cheap reductions that can
be found in developing countries. On the other hand, the CDM also shares the pur-
pose of helping developing countries hosting emission reduction projects to develop in
a sustainable way through the implementation of new and more e±cient technologies.
When deciding on the amount of CDM projects to be implemented, developing
countries must be aware that they may be facing own emission reduction commitments
in the future. Since most emission abatement measures are irreversible, ignoring pos-
sible future commitments could lead to a problem that is very much debated in the
forums of the Framework Convention on Climate Change of the United Nations, the
so-called `low-hanging fruits' (or cream-skimming) issue: the cheapest abatement mea-
sures will be implemented for CDM projects, leaving the developing countries with
only more expensive measures when they have to meet their own commitments in the
future.
Another issue which is much debated is the choice of the type of baseline against
which emission reductions generated via the implementation of a CDM project are
evaluated. Baselines may be either absolute or relative. Under absolute baselines,
emission reductions are de¯ned as the di®erence between estimated business-as-usual
emissions and actual emissions. Under relative baselines, emission reductions are de-
¯ned as the di®erence between the emissions rate (emissions per unit of output) under
an estimated business-as-usual situation and the actual emissions rate, multiplied by
1the actual level of output.1 2
The purpose of this paper is to analyze, from the point of view of a developing coun-
try, the interactions between the `low-hanging fruits' (LHF) issue and the alternative
types of baselines. The (sparse) literature on LHF considers only absolute baselines,
while the literature on baseline types is mainly based on static models and therefore
ignores the LHF issue. However, as it will be shown in this paper, both issues are
related. Let us describe the results of the literature on each of these aspects before
explaining the methodology of our analysis.
On the LHF issue, formal analyses are rather scarce. In an optimal control frame-
work analogous to the Hotelling model of exhaustible natural resources, Rose et al.
(1999) show the conditions under which the LHF problem may arise. In particular,
developing countries would loose their low cost abatement options when cumulative
abatement e®ects are present, as well as under market power and some forms of techno-
logical change. Akita (2001) {using a particular framework characterized by two types
of projects (high-cost and low-cost projects, i.e., high-hanging fruits and low-hanging
fruits){ shows that when the implementation of CDM projects leads to future domestic
technological improvements, the developing country should, under certain conditions,
implement high-cost projects ¯rst. If such conditions, bearing on the size of the tech-
nological improvement and on the amount of credits generated by the project, are
met, then the LHF problem occurs when the low-cost projects are implemented ¯rst.
Narain and van't Veldt (2001) indicate that the LHF issue is mischaracterized given
that developing countries facing emission reduction commitments will also have access
to the international permits market and will therefore not necessarily have to imple-
ment high-cost measures in the future. In their setting, the LHF problem shows up
when project investors have market power as well as when the price of emission credits
increases through time and, at the same time, the developing country is not able to
auction o® contracts for the future rising returns of the CDM projects. Br¶ echet et al.
(2004) show that developing countries should in general participate to the CDM. They
1Various methodologies may be used to determine baselines. Fischer (2002) points out three of
them: historical emissions, an average emissions standard for the industry and expected emissions. All
three can be applied to both absolute and relative baseline types.
2Note that an important strand of the literature on the CDM (and related mechanisms) addresses
the crucial issue of the incentives to overstate emission reductions (see e.g. Millock, 2002, and Fischer,
2002). Such incentives rest upon the di±culty to observe actual emission reductions. In this paper,
we leave this issue aside and assume that the additionality condition of emission reductions is veri¯ed.
2identify three e®ects that however limit the extent of such a participation: the fact
that future allocations of permits to the developing country may vary according to the
amount of CDM projects implemented, the change in permits prices through time and
the uncertainty on future permits prices.
In fact, Rose et al. (1999), Narain and van't Veld (2001) and Br¶ echet et al. (2004)
suggest that the LHF issue is no longer a problem if developing countries can be
compensated for implementing or accepting the implementation of `too many' CDM
projects.3 The level of this (¯nancial) compensation is a®ected by the magnitude
of the various e®ects {as identi¯ed in the di®erent papers{ that are responsible for
the LHF problem. While these authors concentrate on absolute baselines, we will
analyze how the level of such a compensation must be modi¯ed when relative baselines
are used instead of absolute ones. This is of crucial concern since limits to the use
of absolute baselines have been set at the seventh conference of the Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol in Marrakesh (UNFCCC, 2001) and since relative baseline are used in
methodologies for computing baseline emissions of small CDM projects while they are
becoming increasingly important in all kinds of projects (see Executive Board of the
CDM, 2003).
On the baseline issue (absolute versus relative), a few more analyses have been
done. Janssen (2001) shows that investment projects are less risky under an absolute
baseline than under a relative one. However, Laurikka (2002) shows that the relative
baseline leads to more conservative emissions predictions while providing more appro-
priate investment incentives than an absolute baseline. Fischer (2001) points out that
a relative baseline leads to a subsidy to production since the amount of emission credits
generated are proportional to actual output. In that case, the total amount of reduc-
tions may be negatively a®ected because the relative baseline encourages a decrease in
the emissions rate, not in the emissions themselves. However, other authors (see for
instance Winkler and Thorne, 2002) state that such a subsidy e®ect is bene¯cial to sus-
tainable development in some situations, including those where the project leads to the
provision of goods (energy for instance) that would otherwise not be provided. Such
analyses suggest that absolute baselines favor the environment (emission reductions)
while relative baselines favor development (production).
However, these papers are not based on dynamic models including the fact that
the developing county may later commit to emission reductions and that abatement
3This is also suggested in Millock (2002) who does not speci¯cally analyse the LHF issue.
3measures are usually irreversible. Moreover, their authors use various criteria in order
to evaluate the relative performance of the two alternative types of baselines. Our
purpose is to focus on the e®ect of the baselines on the situation of the developing
country only, instead of deriving general recommendations on which baseline should
be used.
In terms of methodology, we integrate both LHF and baseline issues by modelling
absolute and relative CDM baselines in a dynamic framework which takes into account
developing countries future commitments and the irreversibility of abatement measures.
In order to account for relative baselines, a framework endogenizing production is
needed. Moreover, due to the large uncertainties on post-Kyoto commitments, future
permits prices are very uncertain. Our approach also takes this feature into account.
In the main part of the paper, we assume that the CDM projects are implemented
following an unilateral approach as opposed to bi- or multilateral approach. Under
an unilateral approach, the developing country (or an economic agent in this country)
implements the CDM projects and sells itself the emission reduction credits to an
Annex-I country (or an economic agent in this country). Under a bi- or multilateral
approach, the projects are implemented by the Annex-I country (or a group of Annex-I
countries) who bears the costs of such projects while receiving the emission reduction
credits. Hence, the developing country keeps passive. We focus on the unilateral
approach for two reasons. First, it is more realistic since we believe that, once a world
market price emerges for emission permits and credits, developing countries will no
longer keep passive. Second, this approach corresponds to the standard assumption
in economics when markets are analyzed, that is, the trade surplus is shared among
the participating agents. However, we will test the robustness of our results {obtained
under the unilateral approach{ under the bi- or multilateral approach.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the dynamic framework
and model the behavior of a developing country hosting CDM projects when absolute
baselines are used. The case of relative baselines is analyzed and compared to the
absolute baselines one in Section 3. The issue of the low-hanging fruits is then discussed
in Section 4. In these sections, it is assumed that CDM projects are implemented under
an unilateral approach. The bi- or multilateral approach is then analyzed in Section
5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the results and concludes.
42 Model
We consider two periods indexed by t (t = 1;2). In the ¯rst period, the developing
country has no commitment to reduce its emissions but is allowed to implement or host
CDM projects. In the second period, the country faces an emissions constraint. Before
describing the objective function of the developing country, we de¯ne its production
function and describe some preliminary issues. These issues are related to (i) the base-
line against which emission reductions via CDM projects are evaluated, (ii) the future
commitments of the country {its future permits endowments{, (iii) the uncertainty on
future permits prices and (iv) the irreversibility aspect of emission reductions.
2.1 Preliminaries
Since we want to model alternative baselines, we need a framework where production
is endogenous. We therefore consider a representative industry of the host country
whose production technology is described by a Cobb-Douglas function with decreasing





where yt denotes output, et energy and kt capital at time t, with ® and ¯ being strictly
positive parameters (0 < ®;¯ with ® + ¯ < 1). We assume that the use of a certain
amount of energy leads to the same amount of emissions of greenhouse gases.
To reduce its emissions, the industry may reduce its output or increase its energy
e±ciency, i.e., increase the capital-energy ratio (k=e). Since this ratio plays a key role






where ° = ® + ¯ and
¸t = kt=et: (3)
In our framework, CDM projects are considered as abatement measures that in-
crease energy e±ciency. The larger the amount of accepted CDM projects, the larger
the energy e±ciency (i.e., the larger the ¸t). Moreover, for a given level of output, the
cost of increasing energy e±ciency is increasing (marginal costs are increasing).
(i) CDM baseline - In the ¯rst period, the emission reductions generated via a
CDM project are evaluated against either an absolute baseline or a relative baseline.
5Under an absolute baseline, emission reductions are de¯ned as the di®erence between
estimated business-as-usual emissions and actual emissions. Formally, the total amount
of credits generated are given by eBAU
1 ¡ e1 where eBAU
1 is the level of emissions
when no reductions are undertaken, i.e., in the absence of the CDM (to be de¯ned
explicitly below). Under a relative baseline, emission reductions are de¯ned as the
di®erence between the emissions rate (emissions per unit of output) under an estimated
business-as-usual situation and the actual emissions rate, multiplied by the actual level











the level of the output when no reductions are undertaken (to be de¯ned explicitly
below).
(ii) Permits endowment - In the second period, the developing country commits to
emission reductions and receives an amount of emission permits e2 such that






where e e2 is an exogenous amount of emission permits and ± is a positive parameter
(0 · ± · 1). ± denotes the extent to which emission reductions undertaken in a
developing country (via CDM) before its commitment may a®ect its future endowment
of permits. Indeed, since post-Kyoto commitments for developing countries are not yet
de¯ned, there is a risk that earlier reductions (i.e., Kyoto period reductions) a®ect the
reference level of emissions on which negotiations will be based.4 The lower the ±, the
higher the negotiation power of the developing country.
(iii) Uncertainty on permits prices - The emission credits generated via the CDM are
fungible with the permits allocated to the countries committed to emission reductions.
Therefore, we denote by ¿t the price of the permits/credits at period t. Since future
permits prices are very uncertain, we assume that the agents only know the density
function of the permits price in the second period, f (¿2), with ¿2 2 [¿min;¿max],
0 < ¿min < ¿max.
(iv) Irreversibility - There is some irreversibility in the decision to reduce emissions
because, once implemented, the projects typically last more than one commitment
period. Accordingly, if further emission reductions are to be taken subsequently, such
reductions will be more costly than the former ones. As suggested by Rose et al. (1999),
4This problem is not speci¯c to the CDM. In the context of a private polluting ¯rm that must
negotiate on a level of commitment with its authority, the issue of the recognition of 'early reductions'
is a similar problem.
6such an issue of irreversibility is best addressed in a vintage capital model. Since such
models are heavy to handle, these authors rather use, in a continuous time framework,
a general abatement cost function that depends on total cumulative abatement. Once
low cost abatement measures have been undertaken, further reductions are necessarily
more expensive. In a discrete time context, Narain and van't Veld (2001) and Br¶ echet
et al. (2004) use a marginal abatement cost function that is truncated from one period
to the other in order to re°ect the irreversibility of the decisions over two periods and
the fact that additional abatement measures in the future necessarily lead to larger
marginal abatement costs.5
In order to take the irreversibility aspect into account, we assume that the energy
e±ciency indicator (the capital-energy ratio ¸t) cannot decrease through time. Once a
cleaner technology has been implemented {with the purpose of reducing emissions{, it
is not possible to go back and replace that technology by a dirtier one. Such an indirect
interpretation of the irreversibility constraint stands well in line with the concept of
`clean development'. Formally, the irreversibility constraint reads as follows:
¸2 ¸ ¸1: (5)
2.2 Objective function with an absolute baseline
Let us denote by pe and pk the price of, respectively, energy and capital, expressed
in output units. All prices are de°ated by the output price and, for simplicity, are
assumed to be constant over time. In this context, the problem of the representative
industry {which is assumed to be price-taker{ reads as follows:
max
fe1¸0;k1¸0g










y2 ¡ [pee2 + pkk2] + ¿2[e2 ¡ e2]: (7)
The last term of (7), ¿2[e2 ¡ e2], is the net sales of emission permits.







5As mentionned above, Akita (2003) uses a model with only two types of projects, a low cost and
a high cost type projects, but he accounts for possible technological improvements.
7where eBAU
1 is the value of e1 solving problem (6) with T1 = 0 (i.e., in the absence
of the CDM). Under this formulation, CDM credits are generated with respect to an
absolute baseline. We start the analysis with this standard approach. The case of a
relative baseline is analyzed in section 3. Subscripts a and r will denote the value of a
variable under, respectively, the absolute and the relative baseline assumptions.
Recalling (2), (3) and (8), we may rewrite problem (6) in the following way:
max
fea1¸0;¸a1¸0g















subject to (4)-(5) where ° = ® + ¯ and
¦¤






a2 ¡ [pe + pk¸a2]ea2 + ¿2 [e2 ¡ ea2]: (10)
Note that eBAU
1 and e2 are not indexed by a since ea2 = er2 and eBAU
a1 = eBAU
r1 . This
problem is solved by backward induction, starting with the second period.
2.3 Behavior in the second period
The solution of problem (10) leads to two solution regimes according to whether the
irreversibility constraint (5) is binding or not.

















The irreversibility constraint corresponds to
[pe+¿2]=®
pk=¯ ¸ ¸a1. It is more likely to be
binding when the price of the energy in the second period, including the permits price,
is relatively low. This means that it would be more interesting to substitute energy
(and therefore emissions) to capital, which is not possible given the constraint. In
that case, the welfare in the second period decreases with respect to an unconstrained
situation.
When the irreversibility constraint is not binding, the situation is standard: the
levels of emissions and capital are directly determined by their prices, i.e., the price for
8the use of energy (pe), the price of an emission permit in the second period (¿2) and
the price of the capital (pk).
When the irreversibility constraint is binding, the technology is characterized by
the same capital-energy ratio as in the ¯rst period. Then, the levels of the inputs also
depend on the capital-energy ratio of the previous period (¸a1). However, these levels
need not be the same as in period 1. They may be both either larger or smaller.
2.4 Behavior in the ¯rst period
When the irreversibility constraint is not binding, the value of (10), ¦2 (¢), does not
depend on the ¯rst period decisions. Otherwise, ¦2 (¢) decreases with the strength of
the irreversibility constraint. We now state the existence and the unicity of the solution
of problem (9) and we characterize this solution.
Proposition 2.a (i) A solution to problem (9) exists.
(ii) A su±cient condition for the solution to be unique is that (a) either the returns
to scale are su±ciently decreasing for given relative permits prices (¿1=pe) or (b) the
relative permits price is su±ciently low for given returns to scale.
(iii) Then, the solution of problem (9), is characterized by
¸a1 =
[pe + ¿1 ¡ ½±e ¿2]=®
pk=¯
if 0 · ¿1 · ¿2min + ½±e ¿2 (11)
¸a1 <
[pe + ¿1 ¡ ½±e ¿2]=®
pk=¯
if ¿2min + ½±e ¿2 < ¿1 (12)
Proof See appendix (Sections 1 and 2.a). ¥
The su±cient condition for unicity (formally established in the Appendix) is in fact
satis¯ed for all reasonable values of the parameters.6 Moreover, it must be emphasized
that it is a su±cient condition, not a necessary one.
The shape of the capital-energy ratio, ¸a1, is illustrated in Figure 1. The e®ects
of the following three components are highlighted: the endowment, the irreversibility
constraint and the uncertainty on the future permits price. Let us ¯rst assume that, at
the same time, emission reductions have no impact on future endowments (± = 0), the
irreversibility constraint is not taken into account and there is no uncertainty. Then,
6Consider for instance the following parameter values: ® = :2, ¯ = :7, ½ = :9, ± = :5, pe = 1,
pk = :25, ¿2 min = :1 and ¿2 max = :9 with a uniform density function. Then, the su±cient condition is
satis¯ed 8° · 0:94.
9the solution is characterized by S0 (S0´ ¸a1 = ¯ [pe + ¿1]=[®pk]). The optimal value
of the capital-energy ratio is linear in the ¯rst period permits price.
Let us now introduce successively each of the components described above and
analyse how they a®ect the capital/energy ratio.
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Figure 1: The capital-energy ratio as a function of the permits price
S1 is the locus of solutions when only the endowment e®ect is present (i.e., ± > 0)
(S1´ ¸a1 = ¯ [pe + ¿1 ¡ ½±e ¿2]=[®pk]). Indeed, in that case the country anticipates
the fact that emission reductions in the ¯rst period lead to a loss in the second period
permits endowments, which are valued at the expected price e ¿2. Therefore, such an
e®ect discourages emission reductions (i.e., implementation of CDM projects) in the
¯rst period.
S2 is the locus of solutions for the capital-energy ratio when both the endowment
and the irreversibility e®ects are taken into account (i.e., ± > 0 and ¸1 · ¸2). In
such a situation, the irreversibility constraint is not binding when and only when
¿1 · [1 + ½±]e ¿2. Indeed, if the permits price increases from t = 1 to t = 2, the
country substitutes capital to energy since their relative prices change. However, if the
10permits price decreases, a substitution of energy to capital is not feasible due to the
irreversibility constraint and the energy e±ciency is too large given the level of the
second period permits price. Therefore the irreversibility constraint will be binding in
the second period, which is anticipated by the choice of a lower level of the capital-
energy ratio in the ¯rst period (S2 is below S1 for all ¿1 > [1 + ½±]e ¿2).
Finally, S3 is the locus of solutions when there is also uncertainty on future permits
prices. In that case, there is a probability that the irreversibility constraint becomes
binding if the ¯rst period permits price is larger than the lowest possible value of the
second period permits price, ¿2min (see the horizontal axis of Figure 1). This is taken
into account in the ¯rst period by the choice of a lower capital-energy ratio w.r.t. the
situation without uncertainty: S3 departs from S1 earlier than S2 and, for all ¿1, S3
is below S2.
The above considerations on ¸a1 are only related to the input substitution e®ect due
to a change in factor prices. However, the absolute levels of the inputs, and therefore
of the production, are also determined by a production contraction e®ect. We have
the following proposition:
Proposition 2.b Optimal emissions (ea1) are a decreasing function of ¿1 whereas
optimal production (ya1) and capital (ka1) are bounded by decreasing functions of ¿1.
Proof See appendix (Section 2.b). ¥
Hence, we are able to prove that, as a trend, ya1 and ka1 decrease with ¿1. More-
over, numerical simulations show that these decision variables are indeed monotonically
decreasing in ¿1.
As expected, the increase in the price of an input leads to a decrease of both inputs,
and consequently, to a decrease in the output level. This is a rather standard result.
However, we show below that this need not be the case when the CDM baseline is a
relative one.
3 Relative instead of absolute CDM baseline
Under a relative baseline, CDM credits are generated in proportion to output when














1 are the values of, respectively, e1 and y1 solving problem (6)





















subject to (4)-(5) where
¦¤






2 ¡ [pe + pk¸2]e2 + ¿2 [e2 ¡ e2] (15)
subject to (4)-(5).
The objective is thus similar to the one under absolute baselines. However, as
mentioned in earlier studies (see e.g. Fischer 2001, 2002), such a relative baseline leads
to an implicit subsidy to production. The value of this subsidy depends on the permits







Proposition 3.a (i) A solution to problem (14) exists.
(ii) A su±cient condition for the solution to be unique is that (a) either the returns
to scale are su±ciently decreasing for given relative permits prices (¿1=pe) or (b) the
relative permits price is su±ciently low for given returns to scale.
(iii) Then, the solution is characterized by
¸r1 = ¸a1 =
[pe + ¿1 ¡½±e ¿2]=®
pk=¯
if 0 · ¿1 · ¿2min + ½±e ¿2 (16)
¸a1 < ¸r1 <
[pe + ¿1 ¡ ½±e ¿2]=®
pk=¯
if ¿2min + ½±e ¿2 < ¿1 (17)
Proof See appendix (Section 3.a). ¥
The su±cient condition for unicity is the same as the one presented above in propo-
sition 2.a, related to the absolute baseline case.
7In this respect, we follow the approach of Laurikka (2002).
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Figure 2. The capital-energy ratio under both baselines
Figure 2 illustrates the comparison of the capital-energy ratios under both baselines.
The following observations can be made. First, when no e®ects are present, it is not
surprising to observe the same substitution e®ect under both baselines (i.e., ¸r1 =
¸a1, see S0) since relative input prices are exogenous and do not change with the
baseline. Second, the endowment e®ect plays in the same way for both baselines
(see S1). Third, the other elements (irreversibility and uncertainty) start to have an
impact on the solution at the same level of ¿1 (at ¿2min + ½±e ¿2 precisely). Moreover,
when the irreversibility constraint is binding, the irreversibility and uncertainty e®ects
are stronger under the absolute baseline than under the relative one (¸a1 < ¸r1, see
S3a and S3r). Indeed, the gains in the ¯rst period, relative to those in the second
period, are larger under the relative baseline due to the subsidy e®ect identi¯ed above.
Therefore, the cost of being left with too e±cient equipments in the second period (the
irreversibility constraint binding) is relatively lower than under the absolute baseline.
Accordingly, it is in the interest of the country to go further in the substitution of
inputs with respect to the absolute baseline case.
As far as production and emissions are concerned, we state the following result:
13Result 3.b Optimal production and emissions (yr1 and er1) are decreasing and
then increasing (U-shaped) w.r.t. ¿1, with argmin yr1 (¿1) < argmin er1(¿1). Optimal
capital (kr1) is increasing w.r.t. ¿1. ¥
This result is rigorously proven for low and high values of ¿1 (see the appendix,




Proof See appendix (Section 3.c). ¥
We also observe numerically that er1 ¸ ea1, which is not surprising since yr1 ¸ ya1.8
Hence, the production subsidy always leads to higher levels of output, and therefore
of inputs.
The absolute values of the inputs, and therefore of the output, need not be the
same, even if the constraint is not binding (¸r1 = ¸a1). Figure 3 illustrates the shape
of emissions and production under absolute and relative baselines (see ea, ya and er,
yr respectively).9 Under the absolute baseline, the rise in the permits price leads to the
usual inputs substitution and output contraction e®ects (see Proposition 2.b). These
e®ects tend to decrease the levels of both emissions and production. Under the relative
baseline, the subsidy e®ect plays in the other direction. This e®ect tends to increase





per unit of output
(recall (14)) and is thus a linear function of the permits price ¿1. Figure 3 shows that
if ¿1 is su±ciently high, the subsidy e®ect overcomes the output contraction e®ect
due to the increase in the total energy price, so that output increases through the
8Note that in the case of the absolute baseline, the implementation of CDM projects does not lead
to changes in world emissions. However, under relative baselines, world total emissions either decrease
(for low values of ¿1) or increase (for high values of ¿1) throught the implemention of CDM projects.
Indeed, supplementary emissions by industrialized countries amount to e1 [y1r=y1]¡e
¤
r1 while emission
reductions by the developing country are e1 ¡ e
¤
r1. Therefore, total world emissions change by the
following amount: e1 [[y1r=y1] ¡ 1]. This change is negative if y1r < y1, which occurs when ¿1 is low
(see Result 3 b), and positive if y1r > y, which occurs when ¿1 is high.
9This ¯gure corresponds to the following parameter values: ® = :2, ¯ = :7, ½ = :9, ± = :5, pe = 1,
pk = :25, ¿2 min = :1 and ¿2 max = :9 with a uniform density function. For comparison purposes, the
¯gure also shows emissions and production under an absolute baseline.
14implementation of CDM projects. For even larger values of ¿1, this increase of output
overcomes the substitution of capital to energy e®ect due to the change in factor prices,
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Figure 3 - Emissions and output under absolute and relative baselines
Figure 3 also suggests that, at least for some ranges of the price of permits in
period 1, it is possible to ¯nd situations where emissions are reduced and output is
increased under a relative baseline. Such situations seem to ¯t very well with the
purpose of the CDM: allowing for both emission reductions and development (i.e.,
increasing production) at the same time.








r1 are the solution of respectively problem (9) and problem (14),
if either (a) the returns to scale are su±ciently decreasing for given relative permits
prices (¿1=pe) or (b) the relative permits price is su±ciently low for given returns to
scale.
15Proof See appendix (Section 3.c). ¥
Proposition 3.c provides a su±cient (but not necessary) condition for this result to
hold. This condition is satis¯ed for all reasonable values of the parameters.
Surprisingly, pro¯ts are larger under the absolute baseline than under the relative
one. One could have indeed expected that the subsidy, by increasing the level of
output, also leads to larger pro¯ts. Let us give a tentative description of this result by
decomposing the pro¯t under both baselines into four components: (i) the ¯rst period
current pro¯t without the revenues from CDM credits sales (call it e ¼i1), (ii) the ¯rst
period revenue from the sales of CDM credits (Ti1), (iii) the second period current
expected pro¯t without the net sales of permits (E (e ¼i2)) and (iv) the second period
expected revenue (spending) from the net sales (purchases) of permits (E (Ti2)).
From such a decomposition, one can make the following observations. In t = 1,
both e ¼i1 and Ti1 are much larger under the absolute baseline. In t = 2, E (Ti2) is larger
under the relative one while E (e ¼i2) have almost the same value under both baselines.
In the ¯rst period, for any ¿1, the subsidy e®ect under the relative baseline leads to
a level of production that is beyond the one selected under the absolute baseline. The
choice is somehow `distorted' by the presence of the subsidy. Hence, the ¯rst period
current pro¯t e ¼i1 (which does not take the CDM revenues into account) is necessarily
lower under the relative baseline than under the absolute one. Moreover, the CDM
revenues are larger under the absolute baseline. In fact, the absolute baseline is more
generous than the relative one in period 1.
In the second period, the di®erence between the current pro¯t E (e ¼i2) under both
baselines can only come from the irreversibility constraint. Since this constraint is
more stringent under the relative baseline (¸a1 · ¸r1), E (e ¼i2) tends to be larger
under the absolute baseline. However, we observe that the constraint plays a minor
role in that respect. On the contrary, E (Ti2) is signi¯cantly larger under the relative
baseline. This is only due to the permits endowment e®ect: under the relative baseline,
fewer reductions take place in the ¯rst period, which tends to attenuate the permits
endowment e®ect, that is, to increase the initial allocation of permits w.r.t. the absolute
baseline situation.
Thus, as a whole, we observe that the e®ects favoring the absolute baseline dominate
those favoring the relative one.
164 The `low-hanging fruits' issue
Despite the transfers of clean technologies associated with the implementation of CDM
projects, developing countries have been somewhat reluctant to participate in the
CDM. Such a reluctance is often said to be based on the `low-hanging fruits' (LHF) is-
sue: the cheapest abatement measures will be implemented for CDM projects, leaving
the developing countries with only more expensive measures when they have to meet
their own emission reduction commitments in the future.
Analyses in the previous sections have implicitly tackled this issue and suggest that
the LHF problem is unfounded. First, recall that, in the present context, the imple-
mentation of CDM projects corresponds to an increase in the capital-energy ratio (¸).
We have shown that it is always optimal for the developing country to implement CDM
projects for every strictly positive permits price (¸i1(¿1) > ¸i1 (0);8¿1 > 0;i = a;r).
Hence, developing countries should always participate in the CDM and implement at
least some projects.
Second, low cost abatement projects are always implemented ¯rst (since the capital
energy ratio is increasing with the permits price). Therefore, it would never be optimal
for a developing country to keep its low-hanging fruits (low cost projects) for future use
and implement its high cost projects ¯rst. This suggests that, at least in our context,
the terminology `low-hanging' is inappropriate.
Third, the above analyzes have shown that the developing country should accept
the implementation of all CDM projects up to a certain threshold determined by the
optimal capital-energy ratio ¸1(¿1). The developing country should not accept the
implementation of supplementary projects unless it receives the appropriate ¯nancial
compensation.
We study now how the extent of this compensation varies with the context under
consideration, more particularly the type of baseline and the level of the permits price.
Figure 4 illustrates the compensation as a function of the capital energy ratio, ¸1. For
each ¸1, the ¯gure shows ¦i1(¸i1) ¡ ¦i1 (¸1), (i = a;r), for three alternative values
of ¿1, where ¸i1 is the optimal value of the ratio for the corresponding baseline (and
permits price). 10 11
10As mentionned on the ¯gure, the three alternative prices are 0:25, 0:7 and 1:15. The other
parameter values are the same as those used in Figure 2: ® = :2, ¯ = :7, ½ = :9, ± = :5, pe = 1,
pk = :25, ¿2 min = :1 and ¿2 max = :9 with a uniform density function.
11All lines start with a compensation that is equal to zero since we start with very small (always
17Figure 4 - Compensation (vert. axis) as a function of the capital-energy ratio (horiz. axis)
Such an analysis leads to the following three observations.12 (i) For a given ¿1 and
for a given baseline, the compensation increases with the amount of CDM projects
implemented beyond the optimal level. This is fairly intuitive. (ii) For a given ¿1 and
for a given ¢¸ = ¸1 ¡ ¸i1, the compensation is larger under relative baselines than
under absolute ones (although the optimal pro¯ts are always larger under the absolute
baseline). (iii) For a given baseline and for a given ¢¸, the e®ect of an increase in the
permits price (¢¿1) di®ers according to the baseline used: the compensation decreases
signi¯cantly with the permits price under absolute baselines while it does not vary
signi¯cantly under relative baselines (same shape of the curves).
Finally, particular attention must be devoted to sensitivity analyses related to
the endowment e®ect (±) and the uncertainty on future permits prices. An increase
in the ± parameter (measuring the extent to which future allocation of permits are
a®ected by current emission reductions) leads to a strong increase in the level of the
compensation. An increase in the level of uncertainty on future permits prices also
raises the compensation, but by a small amount. These results are observed under
both baselines.
positive) values of ¢¸. We limit these variations (¢¸) up to 100% of the corresponding optimal
capital-energy ratio.
12Sensitivity analyses on the parameters have been performed and con¯rm the robustness of our
results.
185 Multilateral instead of unilateral CDM projects
In sections 2 to 4, the way of modelling the behavior of a representative industry
corresponds to what is usually called the unilateral approach as opposed to bi- or
multilateral approach (see the discussion in Section 1). One may however wonder if
the above results still hold in a multilateral approach. The purpose of this section is
to give some insights on it. To simplify the analysis, we shall assume that there is no
uncertainty and that future allocations of permits are not a®ected by the amount of
emission reductions in the ¯rst period (± = 0).
Let then ' 2 [0;1] be the share of net revenues (from the implementation of the
CDM project) that comes in the hands of the developing country. If no CDM projects











®pk. In this formulation, ¼t is the current pro¯t of the industry
at time t. Hence, ¼1 should not be confused with ¦1 that corresponds to the pro¯t of












+ ½¼2 (¸i1); i = a;r (18)
since it gets only a fraction ' of the CDM revenues. When ' = 1, we are back to the
unilateral projects context.
The industry in the developing country will implement CDM projects only if such
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with 'i = 0. Therefore, the analysis is the same as under unilateral projects and the
developing country implements CDM projects up to ¸i1 =
¯[pe+¿1]
®pk .





¼2 (¸i1), with 'i > 0. Hence, the share of the CDM revenues that the host country
obtains must be su±ciently large in order to induce it to implement some projects.
This is a new result compared to the unilateral projects context where the developing
country always has incentives to participate in the CDM.
13Since we model only two period, ¼2 = ¦2.
19Moreover, when it participates in the CDM (i.e., when 'i · ' < 1 and ¿1 ¸ ¿2),
the developing country implements fewer projects under a multilateral approach than
under an unilateral one. Indeed, as it can be seen from (18), ' < 1 implies that a
lower weight is attributed to the ¯rst period relative to the second one. Accordingly,
pro¯t losses due to the irreversibility constraint (when binding) are relatively more
important in such a situation than under unilateral projects, which leads to the choice
of a lower level of the energy intensity than when ' = 1.
6 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to analyze the interactions between the `low-
hanging fruits' issue and the alternative types of baselines from the point of view of a
developing country. This has been done by modelling both absolute and relative base-
lines while taking into account future emission reduction or limitation commitments
and as well as the irreversibility aspect of abatement measures.
In this framework, the relative baseline leads to a larger amount of production than
the absolute baseline. Indeed, under a relative baseline emission reduction credits play
the role of a subsidy to production. However, we have shown that the developing
countries' industries where emission reductions take place always enjoy larger pro¯ts
under the absolute baseline. When these pro¯ts can be interpreted as a proxy of
the budget devoted to consumption, developing countries governments maximizing its
citizens utility of consumption should foster the use of absolute baselines. Such a result
is of particular concern since current developments tend to be directed towards the use
of relative baselines.
When the developing country implements by itself CDM projects (in an unilateral
context, that is the country is not passive and captures its part of the trade surplus),
we have also highlighted the fact that the `low-hanging fruits' problem is unfounded,
whatever the type of baseline under consideration: developing countries should always
implement at least some CDM projects, and should start by the low cost ones ¯rst.
Moreover, the extent of the compensation that such a country should require if too
many projects were to be implemented has been analyzed. Such a compensation is
larger under a relative baseline than under an absolute one (although absolute baselines
lead to larger pro¯ts). It always increases with the number of projects implemented and
the extent to which future allocations of permits are a®ected by emission reductions
20due to the CDM also plays a key role on the size of this compensation. Moving to a
situation in which the developing country captures only part of the surplus (i.e., in a
bi or multilateral context) does not change fundamentally the results, except that, for
large values for the ¯rst period permits price (i.e., when the irreversibility constraint
is binding), the developing country needs to receive a minimal share of the surplus in
order to have incentives to accept some CDM projects.
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